| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Signed-off-by: BlueWall <jamesh@bluewallgroup.com>
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This reverts commit a3681f3052fb5e98e31e7051329a5b748a8bdd8d until
further testing. Jenkins now fails ossl tests.
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Add permission by identifying uuid (owner/creator/group) and function. Revoke
permission in the same manner. Permission adjustments immediately effect
running scripts ability to call os functions.
osGrantScriptPermissions(UUID key,string function) Threat Level Severe
osRevokeScriptPermissions(UUID key,string function) Threat Level Severe
work sponsored by: Rage
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This is somewhat more in keeping with something like osForceAttachToOtherAvatarFromInventory()
and potentially allows a separate osForceSit() command with High threat rather than VeryHigh that only sits the owner and can be enabled without enabling sit of other avatars.
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string target)
Allows a script IN the target prim to force an avatar to sit on it using normal methods as if called by the client.
Overload method of osForceSit() to allow a script NOT in the target prim to force an avatar to sit on the target prim using normal methods as if called by the client.
This patch is based on previous work from
http://opensimulator.org/mantis/view.php?id=4492
and also includes the suggestions from justincc including change of threat level
Thank you Christos Lightling.
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This patch implements llGetMassMKS as it is described in the wiki
http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/LlGetMassMKS
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Identical to llBreakAllLinks() except that it doesn't require the script to have link permissions.
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These are identical to llCreateLink() and llBreakLink() except that they don't require script permissions.
However, osForceCreateLink() still requires that linked and linkee still have the same owner.
There's also an AutomaticLinkPermission setting in [XEngine] that could be set to true to prevent the LSL function checks.
But this doesn't allow the finer control over which users/scripts, etc. can do this that the OSSL functions provide.
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recognizes megaregions
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An implimentation of llSetContentType including all of the new
constants added since the mantis was raised.
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may yield unexpected results in some cases. No database persistence yet,
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make llGiveMoney async so the script thread is not held up waiting for comms
to an external server.
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the physics engines to return the name that is specified in the INI
file ("physics = XXX") as the type of engine.
This os function is a little different than the others in that it
does not throw an exception of one is not privilaged to use it.
It merely returns an empty string.
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wiki: http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/LlSetLinkCamera
mantis: http://opensimulator.org/mantis/view.php?id=6397
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general-purpose function to see if a given string matches a given regex
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require perms and have higher threat level
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type for an HTTP request. Since the "official" LSL function limits
the use of the response type, it is implemented as osSetContentType
with a string for the content mime type and a threat level of high.
With this function you should be able to implement rather functional
media-on-a-prim application with much less difficulty.
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rule number tracking in next commit.
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owner duplicated them, using the same script delay as llRezObject()"
This reverts commit 2ad9d656b3a1a0c519c9599d7680f98eba7e82b8.
Reverted pending consideration of associated issues.
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duplicated them, using the same script delay as llRezObject()
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Returns the amount of health (in an integer) that an avatar has left in the scene.
If an avatar is not found or safe is enabled on a region, -1 is returned.
Example usage:
default
{
touch_end(integer _t)
{
key agentID = llDetectedKey(0);
osCauseDamage(agentID, 50);
llSay(0, llKey2Name(agentID) + " has " + (string)osGetHealth(agentID) + "% health left.");
}
}
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Signed-off-by: Melanie <melanie@t-data.com>
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if it is a UUID. The function is osIsUUID().
Thanks SignpostMarv!
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entry/prim limit/access restrictions.
Signed-off-by: SignpostMarv <github@signpostmarv.name>
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another avatar in the scene.
Very useful in serious game/environment scenarios where its only allowed for trusted creators.
Threat level Severe
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Allow NPCS to touch obects.
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This works like osForceAttachToAvatar() but allows an object to be directly specified from the script object's inventory rather than forcing it to be rezzed in the scene first.
Still only attaches objects to the owner of the script.
This allows one to bypass the complicated co-ordination of first rezzing objects in the scene before attaching them.
Threat level high.
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llTeleportAgentGlobalCoords. These do NOT use PERMISSION_TELEPORT like
their SL counterparts because that permission is not yet understood by TPVs
based on v1.x.
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Details in the lsl wiki
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UUID.Random().ToString();
Signed-off-by: TBG Renfold <tbg.renfold@g2mv.co.uk>
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These behave identically to llAttachToAvatar() and llDetachFromAvatar() except that they do not enforce the PERMISSION_ATTACH check
Intended for use in completely controlled dedicated environments where these checks are more a UI hinderance than a help.
Threat level high.
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osNpcSay(UUID npc, string message) left untouched
New functions:-
osNpcSay(UUID npc, int channel, string message)
osNpcShout(UUID npc, int channel, string message)
osNpcWhisper(UUID npc, int channel, string message)
Signed-off-by: BlueWall <jamesh@bluewallgroup.com>
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Implemented to behave as if scripts were LSO.
Signed-off-by: nebadon <michael@osgrid.org>
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originally proposed in SL Jira (https://jira.secondlife.com/browse/SVC-244).
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osEjectFromGroup(userID) that invite/eject users to/from groups the object containing the script is set to. These functions also work for closed groups.
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arguments and return values to the modInvoke family of functions.
See http://opensimulator.org/wiki/OSSL_Script_Library/ModInvoke
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This allows one to get description data for a given prim inventory item.
Thanks MarcelEdward and GuduleLapointe!
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from region modules. The LSL translator is extended to generate the
modInvoke format of commands for directly inlined function calls.
A region module can register a function Test() with the name "Test".
LSL code can call that function as "Test()". The compiler will translate
that invocation into modInvoke("Test", ...)
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