diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'linden/indra/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.2.2/cipher/rsa.c')
-rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | linden/indra/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.2.2/cipher/rsa.c | 1264 |
1 files changed, 632 insertions, 632 deletions
diff --git a/linden/indra/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.2.2/cipher/rsa.c b/linden/indra/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.2.2/cipher/rsa.c index 4738f43..9cceba2 100755..100644 --- a/linden/indra/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.2.2/cipher/rsa.c +++ b/linden/indra/libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.2.2/cipher/rsa.c | |||
@@ -1,632 +1,632 @@ | |||
1 | /* rsa.c - RSA function | 1 | /* rsa.c - RSA function |
2 | * Copyright (C) 1997, 1998, 1999 by Werner Koch (dd9jn) | 2 | * Copyright (C) 1997, 1998, 1999 by Werner Koch (dd9jn) |
3 | * Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc. | 3 | * Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc. |
4 | * | 4 | * |
5 | * This file is part of Libgcrypt. | 5 | * This file is part of Libgcrypt. |
6 | * | 6 | * |
7 | * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | 7 | * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
8 | * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as | 8 | * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as |
9 | * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of | 9 | * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of |
10 | * the License, or (at your option) any later version. | 10 | * the License, or (at your option) any later version. |
11 | * | 11 | * |
12 | * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, | 12 | * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
13 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | 13 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
14 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the | 14 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
15 | * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. | 15 | * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. |
16 | * | 16 | * |
17 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public | 17 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public |
18 | * License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software | 18 | * License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software |
19 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA | 19 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA |
20 | */ | 20 | */ |
21 | 21 | ||
22 | /* This code uses an algorithm protected by U.S. Patent #4,405,829 | 22 | /* This code uses an algorithm protected by U.S. Patent #4,405,829 |
23 | which expired on September 20, 2000. The patent holder placed that | 23 | which expired on September 20, 2000. The patent holder placed that |
24 | patent into the public domain on Sep 6th, 2000. | 24 | patent into the public domain on Sep 6th, 2000. |
25 | */ | 25 | */ |
26 | 26 | ||
27 | #include <config.h> | 27 | #include <config.h> |
28 | #include <stdio.h> | 28 | #include <stdio.h> |
29 | #include <stdlib.h> | 29 | #include <stdlib.h> |
30 | #include <string.h> | 30 | #include <string.h> |
31 | #include "g10lib.h" | 31 | #include "g10lib.h" |
32 | #include "mpi.h" | 32 | #include "mpi.h" |
33 | #include "cipher.h" | 33 | #include "cipher.h" |
34 | 34 | ||
35 | 35 | ||
36 | typedef struct | 36 | typedef struct |
37 | { | 37 | { |
38 | gcry_mpi_t n; /* modulus */ | 38 | gcry_mpi_t n; /* modulus */ |
39 | gcry_mpi_t e; /* exponent */ | 39 | gcry_mpi_t e; /* exponent */ |
40 | } RSA_public_key; | 40 | } RSA_public_key; |
41 | 41 | ||
42 | 42 | ||
43 | typedef struct | 43 | typedef struct |
44 | { | 44 | { |
45 | gcry_mpi_t n; /* public modulus */ | 45 | gcry_mpi_t n; /* public modulus */ |
46 | gcry_mpi_t e; /* public exponent */ | 46 | gcry_mpi_t e; /* public exponent */ |
47 | gcry_mpi_t d; /* exponent */ | 47 | gcry_mpi_t d; /* exponent */ |
48 | gcry_mpi_t p; /* prime p. */ | 48 | gcry_mpi_t p; /* prime p. */ |
49 | gcry_mpi_t q; /* prime q. */ | 49 | gcry_mpi_t q; /* prime q. */ |
50 | gcry_mpi_t u; /* inverse of p mod q. */ | 50 | gcry_mpi_t u; /* inverse of p mod q. */ |
51 | } RSA_secret_key; | 51 | } RSA_secret_key; |
52 | 52 | ||
53 | 53 | ||
54 | static void test_keys (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits); | 54 | static void test_keys (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits); |
55 | static void generate (RSA_secret_key *sk, | 55 | static void generate (RSA_secret_key *sk, |
56 | unsigned int nbits, unsigned long use_e); | 56 | unsigned int nbits, unsigned long use_e); |
57 | static int check_secret_key (RSA_secret_key *sk); | 57 | static int check_secret_key (RSA_secret_key *sk); |
58 | static void public (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_public_key *skey); | 58 | static void public (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_public_key *skey); |
59 | static void secret (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_secret_key *skey); | 59 | static void secret (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_secret_key *skey); |
60 | 60 | ||
61 | 61 | ||
62 | static void | 62 | static void |
63 | test_keys( RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits ) | 63 | test_keys( RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits ) |
64 | { | 64 | { |
65 | RSA_public_key pk; | 65 | RSA_public_key pk; |
66 | gcry_mpi_t test = gcry_mpi_new ( nbits ); | 66 | gcry_mpi_t test = gcry_mpi_new ( nbits ); |
67 | gcry_mpi_t out1 = gcry_mpi_new ( nbits ); | 67 | gcry_mpi_t out1 = gcry_mpi_new ( nbits ); |
68 | gcry_mpi_t out2 = gcry_mpi_new ( nbits ); | 68 | gcry_mpi_t out2 = gcry_mpi_new ( nbits ); |
69 | 69 | ||
70 | pk.n = sk->n; | 70 | pk.n = sk->n; |
71 | pk.e = sk->e; | 71 | pk.e = sk->e; |
72 | gcry_mpi_randomize( test, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM ); | 72 | gcry_mpi_randomize( test, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM ); |
73 | 73 | ||
74 | public( out1, test, &pk ); | 74 | public( out1, test, &pk ); |
75 | secret( out2, out1, sk ); | 75 | secret( out2, out1, sk ); |
76 | if( mpi_cmp( test, out2 ) ) | 76 | if( mpi_cmp( test, out2 ) ) |
77 | log_fatal("RSA operation: public, secret failed\n"); | 77 | log_fatal("RSA operation: public, secret failed\n"); |
78 | secret( out1, test, sk ); | 78 | secret( out1, test, sk ); |
79 | public( out2, out1, &pk ); | 79 | public( out2, out1, &pk ); |
80 | if( mpi_cmp( test, out2 ) ) | 80 | if( mpi_cmp( test, out2 ) ) |
81 | log_fatal("RSA operation: secret, public failed\n"); | 81 | log_fatal("RSA operation: secret, public failed\n"); |
82 | gcry_mpi_release ( test ); | 82 | gcry_mpi_release ( test ); |
83 | gcry_mpi_release ( out1 ); | 83 | gcry_mpi_release ( out1 ); |
84 | gcry_mpi_release ( out2 ); | 84 | gcry_mpi_release ( out2 ); |
85 | } | 85 | } |
86 | 86 | ||
87 | 87 | ||
88 | /* Callback used by the prime generation to test whether the exponent | 88 | /* Callback used by the prime generation to test whether the exponent |
89 | is suitable. Returns 0 if the test has been passed. */ | 89 | is suitable. Returns 0 if the test has been passed. */ |
90 | static int | 90 | static int |
91 | check_exponent (void *arg, gcry_mpi_t a) | 91 | check_exponent (void *arg, gcry_mpi_t a) |
92 | { | 92 | { |
93 | gcry_mpi_t e = arg; | 93 | gcry_mpi_t e = arg; |
94 | gcry_mpi_t tmp; | 94 | gcry_mpi_t tmp; |
95 | int result; | 95 | int result; |
96 | 96 | ||
97 | mpi_sub_ui (a, a, 1); | 97 | mpi_sub_ui (a, a, 1); |
98 | tmp = _gcry_mpi_alloc_like (a); | 98 | tmp = _gcry_mpi_alloc_like (a); |
99 | result = !gcry_mpi_gcd(tmp, e, a); /* GCD is not 1. */ | 99 | result = !gcry_mpi_gcd(tmp, e, a); /* GCD is not 1. */ |
100 | gcry_mpi_release (tmp); | 100 | gcry_mpi_release (tmp); |
101 | mpi_add_ui (a, a, 1); | 101 | mpi_add_ui (a, a, 1); |
102 | return result; | 102 | return result; |
103 | } | 103 | } |
104 | 104 | ||
105 | /**************** | 105 | /**************** |
106 | * Generate a key pair with a key of size NBITS. | 106 | * Generate a key pair with a key of size NBITS. |
107 | * USE_E = 0 let Libcgrypt decide what exponent to use. | 107 | * USE_E = 0 let Libcgrypt decide what exponent to use. |
108 | * = 1 request the use of a "secure" exponent; this is required by some | 108 | * = 1 request the use of a "secure" exponent; this is required by some |
109 | * specification to be 65537. | 109 | * specification to be 65537. |
110 | * > 2 Try starting at this value until a working exponent is found. | 110 | * > 2 Try starting at this value until a working exponent is found. |
111 | * Returns: 2 structures filled with all needed values | 111 | * Returns: 2 structures filled with all needed values |
112 | */ | 112 | */ |
113 | static void | 113 | static void |
114 | generate (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, unsigned long use_e) | 114 | generate (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, unsigned long use_e) |
115 | { | 115 | { |
116 | gcry_mpi_t p, q; /* the two primes */ | 116 | gcry_mpi_t p, q; /* the two primes */ |
117 | gcry_mpi_t d; /* the private key */ | 117 | gcry_mpi_t d; /* the private key */ |
118 | gcry_mpi_t u; | 118 | gcry_mpi_t u; |
119 | gcry_mpi_t t1, t2; | 119 | gcry_mpi_t t1, t2; |
120 | gcry_mpi_t n; /* the public key */ | 120 | gcry_mpi_t n; /* the public key */ |
121 | gcry_mpi_t e; /* the exponent */ | 121 | gcry_mpi_t e; /* the exponent */ |
122 | gcry_mpi_t phi; /* helper: (p-1)(q-1) */ | 122 | gcry_mpi_t phi; /* helper: (p-1)(q-1) */ |
123 | gcry_mpi_t g; | 123 | gcry_mpi_t g; |
124 | gcry_mpi_t f; | 124 | gcry_mpi_t f; |
125 | 125 | ||
126 | /* make sure that nbits is even so that we generate p, q of equal size */ | 126 | /* make sure that nbits is even so that we generate p, q of equal size */ |
127 | if ( (nbits&1) ) | 127 | if ( (nbits&1) ) |
128 | nbits++; | 128 | nbits++; |
129 | 129 | ||
130 | if (use_e == 1) /* Alias for a secure value. */ | 130 | if (use_e == 1) /* Alias for a secure value. */ |
131 | use_e = 65537; /* as demanded by Spinx. */ | 131 | use_e = 65537; /* as demanded by Spinx. */ |
132 | 132 | ||
133 | /* Public exponent: | 133 | /* Public exponent: |
134 | In general we use 41 as this is quite fast and more secure than the | 134 | In general we use 41 as this is quite fast and more secure than the |
135 | commonly used 17. Benchmarking the RSA verify function | 135 | commonly used 17. Benchmarking the RSA verify function |
136 | with a 1024 bit key yields (2001-11-08): | 136 | with a 1024 bit key yields (2001-11-08): |
137 | e=17 0.54 ms | 137 | e=17 0.54 ms |
138 | e=41 0.75 ms | 138 | e=41 0.75 ms |
139 | e=257 0.95 ms | 139 | e=257 0.95 ms |
140 | e=65537 1.80 ms | 140 | e=65537 1.80 ms |
141 | */ | 141 | */ |
142 | e = mpi_alloc( (32+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB ); | 142 | e = mpi_alloc( (32+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB ); |
143 | if (!use_e) | 143 | if (!use_e) |
144 | mpi_set_ui (e, 41); /* This is a reasonable secure and fast value */ | 144 | mpi_set_ui (e, 41); /* This is a reasonable secure and fast value */ |
145 | else | 145 | else |
146 | { | 146 | { |
147 | use_e |= 1; /* make sure this is odd */ | 147 | use_e |= 1; /* make sure this is odd */ |
148 | mpi_set_ui (e, use_e); | 148 | mpi_set_ui (e, use_e); |
149 | } | 149 | } |
150 | 150 | ||
151 | n = gcry_mpi_new (nbits); | 151 | n = gcry_mpi_new (nbits); |
152 | 152 | ||
153 | p = q = NULL; | 153 | p = q = NULL; |
154 | do | 154 | do |
155 | { | 155 | { |
156 | /* select two (very secret) primes */ | 156 | /* select two (very secret) primes */ |
157 | if (p) | 157 | if (p) |
158 | gcry_mpi_release (p); | 158 | gcry_mpi_release (p); |
159 | if (q) | 159 | if (q) |
160 | gcry_mpi_release (q); | 160 | gcry_mpi_release (q); |
161 | if (use_e) | 161 | if (use_e) |
162 | { /* Do an extra test to ensure that the given exponent is | 162 | { /* Do an extra test to ensure that the given exponent is |
163 | suitable. */ | 163 | suitable. */ |
164 | p = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, check_exponent, e); | 164 | p = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, check_exponent, e); |
165 | q = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, check_exponent, e); | 165 | q = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, check_exponent, e); |
166 | } | 166 | } |
167 | else | 167 | else |
168 | { /* We check the exponent later. */ | 168 | { /* We check the exponent later. */ |
169 | p = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, NULL, NULL); | 169 | p = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, NULL, NULL); |
170 | q = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, NULL, NULL); | 170 | q = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, NULL, NULL); |
171 | } | 171 | } |
172 | if (mpi_cmp (p, q) > 0 ) /* p shall be smaller than q (for calc of u)*/ | 172 | if (mpi_cmp (p, q) > 0 ) /* p shall be smaller than q (for calc of u)*/ |
173 | mpi_swap(p,q); | 173 | mpi_swap(p,q); |
174 | /* calculate the modulus */ | 174 | /* calculate the modulus */ |
175 | mpi_mul( n, p, q ); | 175 | mpi_mul( n, p, q ); |
176 | } | 176 | } |
177 | while ( mpi_get_nbits(n) != nbits ); | 177 | while ( mpi_get_nbits(n) != nbits ); |
178 | 178 | ||
179 | /* calculate Euler totient: phi = (p-1)(q-1) */ | 179 | /* calculate Euler totient: phi = (p-1)(q-1) */ |
180 | t1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) ); | 180 | t1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) ); |
181 | t2 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) ); | 181 | t2 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) ); |
182 | phi = gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits ); | 182 | phi = gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits ); |
183 | g = gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits ); | 183 | g = gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits ); |
184 | f = gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits ); | 184 | f = gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits ); |
185 | mpi_sub_ui( t1, p, 1 ); | 185 | mpi_sub_ui( t1, p, 1 ); |
186 | mpi_sub_ui( t2, q, 1 ); | 186 | mpi_sub_ui( t2, q, 1 ); |
187 | mpi_mul( phi, t1, t2 ); | 187 | mpi_mul( phi, t1, t2 ); |
188 | gcry_mpi_gcd(g, t1, t2); | 188 | gcry_mpi_gcd(g, t1, t2); |
189 | mpi_fdiv_q(f, phi, g); | 189 | mpi_fdiv_q(f, phi, g); |
190 | 190 | ||
191 | while (!gcry_mpi_gcd(t1, e, phi)) /* (while gcd is not 1) */ | 191 | while (!gcry_mpi_gcd(t1, e, phi)) /* (while gcd is not 1) */ |
192 | { | 192 | { |
193 | if (use_e) | 193 | if (use_e) |
194 | BUG (); /* The prime generator already made sure that we | 194 | BUG (); /* The prime generator already made sure that we |
195 | never can get to here. */ | 195 | never can get to here. */ |
196 | mpi_add_ui (e, e, 2); | 196 | mpi_add_ui (e, e, 2); |
197 | } | 197 | } |
198 | 198 | ||
199 | /* calculate the secret key d = e^1 mod phi */ | 199 | /* calculate the secret key d = e^1 mod phi */ |
200 | d = gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits ); | 200 | d = gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits ); |
201 | mpi_invm(d, e, f ); | 201 | mpi_invm(d, e, f ); |
202 | /* calculate the inverse of p and q (used for chinese remainder theorem)*/ | 202 | /* calculate the inverse of p and q (used for chinese remainder theorem)*/ |
203 | u = gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits ); | 203 | u = gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits ); |
204 | mpi_invm(u, p, q ); | 204 | mpi_invm(u, p, q ); |
205 | 205 | ||
206 | if( DBG_CIPHER ) | 206 | if( DBG_CIPHER ) |
207 | { | 207 | { |
208 | log_mpidump(" p= ", p ); | 208 | log_mpidump(" p= ", p ); |
209 | log_mpidump(" q= ", q ); | 209 | log_mpidump(" q= ", q ); |
210 | log_mpidump("phi= ", phi ); | 210 | log_mpidump("phi= ", phi ); |
211 | log_mpidump(" g= ", g ); | 211 | log_mpidump(" g= ", g ); |
212 | log_mpidump(" f= ", f ); | 212 | log_mpidump(" f= ", f ); |
213 | log_mpidump(" n= ", n ); | 213 | log_mpidump(" n= ", n ); |
214 | log_mpidump(" e= ", e ); | 214 | log_mpidump(" e= ", e ); |
215 | log_mpidump(" d= ", d ); | 215 | log_mpidump(" d= ", d ); |
216 | log_mpidump(" u= ", u ); | 216 | log_mpidump(" u= ", u ); |
217 | } | 217 | } |
218 | 218 | ||
219 | gcry_mpi_release (t1); | 219 | gcry_mpi_release (t1); |
220 | gcry_mpi_release (t2); | 220 | gcry_mpi_release (t2); |
221 | gcry_mpi_release (phi); | 221 | gcry_mpi_release (phi); |
222 | gcry_mpi_release (f); | 222 | gcry_mpi_release (f); |
223 | gcry_mpi_release (g); | 223 | gcry_mpi_release (g); |
224 | 224 | ||
225 | sk->n = n; | 225 | sk->n = n; |
226 | sk->e = e; | 226 | sk->e = e; |
227 | sk->p = p; | 227 | sk->p = p; |
228 | sk->q = q; | 228 | sk->q = q; |
229 | sk->d = d; | 229 | sk->d = d; |
230 | sk->u = u; | 230 | sk->u = u; |
231 | 231 | ||
232 | /* now we can test our keys (this should never fail!) */ | 232 | /* now we can test our keys (this should never fail!) */ |
233 | test_keys( sk, nbits - 64 ); | 233 | test_keys( sk, nbits - 64 ); |
234 | } | 234 | } |
235 | 235 | ||
236 | 236 | ||
237 | /**************** | 237 | /**************** |
238 | * Test wether the secret key is valid. | 238 | * Test wether the secret key is valid. |
239 | * Returns: true if this is a valid key. | 239 | * Returns: true if this is a valid key. |
240 | */ | 240 | */ |
241 | static int | 241 | static int |
242 | check_secret_key( RSA_secret_key *sk ) | 242 | check_secret_key( RSA_secret_key *sk ) |
243 | { | 243 | { |
244 | int rc; | 244 | int rc; |
245 | gcry_mpi_t temp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(sk->p)*2 ); | 245 | gcry_mpi_t temp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(sk->p)*2 ); |
246 | 246 | ||
247 | mpi_mul(temp, sk->p, sk->q ); | 247 | mpi_mul(temp, sk->p, sk->q ); |
248 | rc = mpi_cmp( temp, sk->n ); | 248 | rc = mpi_cmp( temp, sk->n ); |
249 | mpi_free(temp); | 249 | mpi_free(temp); |
250 | return !rc; | 250 | return !rc; |
251 | } | 251 | } |
252 | 252 | ||
253 | 253 | ||
254 | 254 | ||
255 | /**************** | 255 | /**************** |
256 | * Public key operation. Encrypt INPUT with PKEY and put result into OUTPUT. | 256 | * Public key operation. Encrypt INPUT with PKEY and put result into OUTPUT. |
257 | * | 257 | * |
258 | * c = m^e mod n | 258 | * c = m^e mod n |
259 | * | 259 | * |
260 | * Where c is OUTPUT, m is INPUT and e,n are elements of PKEY. | 260 | * Where c is OUTPUT, m is INPUT and e,n are elements of PKEY. |
261 | */ | 261 | */ |
262 | static void | 262 | static void |
263 | public(gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_public_key *pkey ) | 263 | public(gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_public_key *pkey ) |
264 | { | 264 | { |
265 | if( output == input ) /* powm doesn't like output and input the same */ | 265 | if( output == input ) /* powm doesn't like output and input the same */ |
266 | { | 266 | { |
267 | gcry_mpi_t x = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(input)*2 ); | 267 | gcry_mpi_t x = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(input)*2 ); |
268 | mpi_powm( x, input, pkey->e, pkey->n ); | 268 | mpi_powm( x, input, pkey->e, pkey->n ); |
269 | mpi_set(output, x); | 269 | mpi_set(output, x); |
270 | mpi_free(x); | 270 | mpi_free(x); |
271 | } | 271 | } |
272 | else | 272 | else |
273 | mpi_powm( output, input, pkey->e, pkey->n ); | 273 | mpi_powm( output, input, pkey->e, pkey->n ); |
274 | } | 274 | } |
275 | 275 | ||
276 | #if 0 | 276 | #if 0 |
277 | static void | 277 | static void |
278 | stronger_key_check ( RSA_secret_key *skey ) | 278 | stronger_key_check ( RSA_secret_key *skey ) |
279 | { | 279 | { |
280 | gcry_mpi_t t = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 ); | 280 | gcry_mpi_t t = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 ); |
281 | gcry_mpi_t t1 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 ); | 281 | gcry_mpi_t t1 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 ); |
282 | gcry_mpi_t t2 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 ); | 282 | gcry_mpi_t t2 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 ); |
283 | gcry_mpi_t phi = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 ); | 283 | gcry_mpi_t phi = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 ); |
284 | 284 | ||
285 | /* check that n == p * q */ | 285 | /* check that n == p * q */ |
286 | mpi_mul( t, skey->p, skey->q); | 286 | mpi_mul( t, skey->p, skey->q); |
287 | if (mpi_cmp( t, skey->n) ) | 287 | if (mpi_cmp( t, skey->n) ) |
288 | log_info ( "RSA Oops: n != p * q\n" ); | 288 | log_info ( "RSA Oops: n != p * q\n" ); |
289 | 289 | ||
290 | /* check that p is less than q */ | 290 | /* check that p is less than q */ |
291 | if( mpi_cmp( skey->p, skey->q ) > 0 ) | 291 | if( mpi_cmp( skey->p, skey->q ) > 0 ) |
292 | { | 292 | { |
293 | log_info ("RSA Oops: p >= q - fixed\n"); | 293 | log_info ("RSA Oops: p >= q - fixed\n"); |
294 | _gcry_mpi_swap ( skey->p, skey->q); | 294 | _gcry_mpi_swap ( skey->p, skey->q); |
295 | } | 295 | } |
296 | 296 | ||
297 | /* check that e divides neither p-1 nor q-1 */ | 297 | /* check that e divides neither p-1 nor q-1 */ |
298 | mpi_sub_ui(t, skey->p, 1 ); | 298 | mpi_sub_ui(t, skey->p, 1 ); |
299 | mpi_fdiv_r(t, t, skey->e ); | 299 | mpi_fdiv_r(t, t, skey->e ); |
300 | if ( !mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) ) | 300 | if ( !mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) ) |
301 | log_info ( "RSA Oops: e divides p-1\n" ); | 301 | log_info ( "RSA Oops: e divides p-1\n" ); |
302 | mpi_sub_ui(t, skey->q, 1 ); | 302 | mpi_sub_ui(t, skey->q, 1 ); |
303 | mpi_fdiv_r(t, t, skey->e ); | 303 | mpi_fdiv_r(t, t, skey->e ); |
304 | if ( !mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) ) | 304 | if ( !mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) ) |
305 | log_info ( "RSA Oops: e divides q-1\n" ); | 305 | log_info ( "RSA Oops: e divides q-1\n" ); |
306 | 306 | ||
307 | /* check that d is correct */ | 307 | /* check that d is correct */ |
308 | mpi_sub_ui( t1, skey->p, 1 ); | 308 | mpi_sub_ui( t1, skey->p, 1 ); |
309 | mpi_sub_ui( t2, skey->q, 1 ); | 309 | mpi_sub_ui( t2, skey->q, 1 ); |
310 | mpi_mul( phi, t1, t2 ); | 310 | mpi_mul( phi, t1, t2 ); |
311 | gcry_mpi_gcd(t, t1, t2); | 311 | gcry_mpi_gcd(t, t1, t2); |
312 | mpi_fdiv_q(t, phi, t); | 312 | mpi_fdiv_q(t, phi, t); |
313 | mpi_invm(t, skey->e, t ); | 313 | mpi_invm(t, skey->e, t ); |
314 | if ( mpi_cmp(t, skey->d ) ) | 314 | if ( mpi_cmp(t, skey->d ) ) |
315 | { | 315 | { |
316 | log_info ( "RSA Oops: d is wrong - fixed\n"); | 316 | log_info ( "RSA Oops: d is wrong - fixed\n"); |
317 | mpi_set (skey->d, t); | 317 | mpi_set (skey->d, t); |
318 | _gcry_log_mpidump (" fixed d", skey->d); | 318 | _gcry_log_mpidump (" fixed d", skey->d); |
319 | } | 319 | } |
320 | 320 | ||
321 | /* check for correctness of u */ | 321 | /* check for correctness of u */ |
322 | mpi_invm(t, skey->p, skey->q ); | 322 | mpi_invm(t, skey->p, skey->q ); |
323 | if ( mpi_cmp(t, skey->u ) ) | 323 | if ( mpi_cmp(t, skey->u ) ) |
324 | { | 324 | { |
325 | log_info ( "RSA Oops: u is wrong - fixed\n"); | 325 | log_info ( "RSA Oops: u is wrong - fixed\n"); |
326 | mpi_set (skey->u, t); | 326 | mpi_set (skey->u, t); |
327 | _gcry_log_mpidump (" fixed u", skey->u); | 327 | _gcry_log_mpidump (" fixed u", skey->u); |
328 | } | 328 | } |
329 | 329 | ||
330 | log_info ( "RSA secret key check finished\n"); | 330 | log_info ( "RSA secret key check finished\n"); |
331 | 331 | ||
332 | mpi_free (t); | 332 | mpi_free (t); |
333 | mpi_free (t1); | 333 | mpi_free (t1); |
334 | mpi_free (t2); | 334 | mpi_free (t2); |
335 | mpi_free (phi); | 335 | mpi_free (phi); |
336 | } | 336 | } |
337 | #endif | 337 | #endif |
338 | 338 | ||
339 | 339 | ||
340 | 340 | ||
341 | /**************** | 341 | /**************** |
342 | * Secret key operation. Encrypt INPUT with SKEY and put result into OUTPUT. | 342 | * Secret key operation. Encrypt INPUT with SKEY and put result into OUTPUT. |
343 | * | 343 | * |
344 | * m = c^d mod n | 344 | * m = c^d mod n |
345 | * | 345 | * |
346 | * Or faster: | 346 | * Or faster: |
347 | * | 347 | * |
348 | * m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p | 348 | * m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p |
349 | * m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q | 349 | * m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q |
350 | * h = u * (m2 - m1) mod q | 350 | * h = u * (m2 - m1) mod q |
351 | * m = m1 + h * p | 351 | * m = m1 + h * p |
352 | * | 352 | * |
353 | * Where m is OUTPUT, c is INPUT and d,n,p,q,u are elements of SKEY. | 353 | * Where m is OUTPUT, c is INPUT and d,n,p,q,u are elements of SKEY. |
354 | */ | 354 | */ |
355 | static void | 355 | static void |
356 | secret(gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_secret_key *skey ) | 356 | secret(gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_secret_key *skey ) |
357 | { | 357 | { |
358 | if (!skey->p && !skey->q && !skey->u) | 358 | if (!skey->p && !skey->q && !skey->u) |
359 | { | 359 | { |
360 | mpi_powm (output, input, skey->d, skey->n); | 360 | mpi_powm (output, input, skey->d, skey->n); |
361 | } | 361 | } |
362 | else | 362 | else |
363 | { | 363 | { |
364 | gcry_mpi_t m1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 ); | 364 | gcry_mpi_t m1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 ); |
365 | gcry_mpi_t m2 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 ); | 365 | gcry_mpi_t m2 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 ); |
366 | gcry_mpi_t h = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 ); | 366 | gcry_mpi_t h = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 ); |
367 | 367 | ||
368 | /* m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p */ | 368 | /* m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p */ |
369 | mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->p, 1 ); | 369 | mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->p, 1 ); |
370 | mpi_fdiv_r( h, skey->d, h ); | 370 | mpi_fdiv_r( h, skey->d, h ); |
371 | mpi_powm( m1, input, h, skey->p ); | 371 | mpi_powm( m1, input, h, skey->p ); |
372 | /* m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q */ | 372 | /* m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q */ |
373 | mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->q, 1 ); | 373 | mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->q, 1 ); |
374 | mpi_fdiv_r( h, skey->d, h ); | 374 | mpi_fdiv_r( h, skey->d, h ); |
375 | mpi_powm( m2, input, h, skey->q ); | 375 | mpi_powm( m2, input, h, skey->q ); |
376 | /* h = u * ( m2 - m1 ) mod q */ | 376 | /* h = u * ( m2 - m1 ) mod q */ |
377 | mpi_sub( h, m2, m1 ); | 377 | mpi_sub( h, m2, m1 ); |
378 | if ( mpi_is_neg( h ) ) | 378 | if ( mpi_is_neg( h ) ) |
379 | mpi_add ( h, h, skey->q ); | 379 | mpi_add ( h, h, skey->q ); |
380 | mpi_mulm( h, skey->u, h, skey->q ); | 380 | mpi_mulm( h, skey->u, h, skey->q ); |
381 | /* m = m2 + h * p */ | 381 | /* m = m2 + h * p */ |
382 | mpi_mul ( h, h, skey->p ); | 382 | mpi_mul ( h, h, skey->p ); |
383 | mpi_add ( output, m1, h ); | 383 | mpi_add ( output, m1, h ); |
384 | 384 | ||
385 | mpi_free ( h ); | 385 | mpi_free ( h ); |
386 | mpi_free ( m1 ); | 386 | mpi_free ( m1 ); |
387 | mpi_free ( m2 ); | 387 | mpi_free ( m2 ); |
388 | } | 388 | } |
389 | } | 389 | } |
390 | 390 | ||
391 | 391 | ||
392 | 392 | ||
393 | /* Perform RSA blinding. */ | 393 | /* Perform RSA blinding. */ |
394 | static gcry_mpi_t | 394 | static gcry_mpi_t |
395 | rsa_blind (gcry_mpi_t x, gcry_mpi_t r, gcry_mpi_t e, gcry_mpi_t n) | 395 | rsa_blind (gcry_mpi_t x, gcry_mpi_t r, gcry_mpi_t e, gcry_mpi_t n) |
396 | { | 396 | { |
397 | /* A helper. */ | 397 | /* A helper. */ |
398 | gcry_mpi_t a; | 398 | gcry_mpi_t a; |
399 | 399 | ||
400 | /* Result. */ | 400 | /* Result. */ |
401 | gcry_mpi_t y; | 401 | gcry_mpi_t y; |
402 | 402 | ||
403 | a = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (n)); | 403 | a = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (n)); |
404 | y = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (n)); | 404 | y = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (n)); |
405 | 405 | ||
406 | /* Now we calculate: y = (x * r^e) mod n, where r is the random | 406 | /* Now we calculate: y = (x * r^e) mod n, where r is the random |
407 | number, e is the public exponent, x is the non-blinded data and n | 407 | number, e is the public exponent, x is the non-blinded data and n |
408 | is the RSA modulus. */ | 408 | is the RSA modulus. */ |
409 | gcry_mpi_powm (a, r, e, n); | 409 | gcry_mpi_powm (a, r, e, n); |
410 | gcry_mpi_mulm (y, a, x, n); | 410 | gcry_mpi_mulm (y, a, x, n); |
411 | 411 | ||
412 | gcry_mpi_release (a); | 412 | gcry_mpi_release (a); |
413 | 413 | ||
414 | return y; | 414 | return y; |
415 | } | 415 | } |
416 | 416 | ||
417 | /* Undo RSA blinding. */ | 417 | /* Undo RSA blinding. */ |
418 | static gcry_mpi_t | 418 | static gcry_mpi_t |
419 | rsa_unblind (gcry_mpi_t x, gcry_mpi_t ri, gcry_mpi_t n) | 419 | rsa_unblind (gcry_mpi_t x, gcry_mpi_t ri, gcry_mpi_t n) |
420 | { | 420 | { |
421 | gcry_mpi_t y; | 421 | gcry_mpi_t y; |
422 | 422 | ||
423 | y = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (n)); | 423 | y = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (n)); |
424 | 424 | ||
425 | /* Here we calculate: y = (x * r^-1) mod n, where x is the blinded | 425 | /* Here we calculate: y = (x * r^-1) mod n, where x is the blinded |
426 | decrypted data, ri is the modular multiplicative inverse of r and | 426 | decrypted data, ri is the modular multiplicative inverse of r and |
427 | n is the RSA modulus. */ | 427 | n is the RSA modulus. */ |
428 | 428 | ||
429 | gcry_mpi_mulm (y, ri, x, n); | 429 | gcry_mpi_mulm (y, ri, x, n); |
430 | 430 | ||
431 | return y; | 431 | return y; |
432 | } | 432 | } |
433 | 433 | ||
434 | /********************************************* | 434 | /********************************************* |
435 | ************** interface ****************** | 435 | ************** interface ****************** |
436 | *********************************************/ | 436 | *********************************************/ |
437 | 437 | ||
438 | gcry_err_code_t | 438 | gcry_err_code_t |
439 | _gcry_rsa_generate (int algo, unsigned int nbits, unsigned long use_e, | 439 | _gcry_rsa_generate (int algo, unsigned int nbits, unsigned long use_e, |
440 | gcry_mpi_t *skey, gcry_mpi_t **retfactors) | 440 | gcry_mpi_t *skey, gcry_mpi_t **retfactors) |
441 | { | 441 | { |
442 | RSA_secret_key sk; | 442 | RSA_secret_key sk; |
443 | 443 | ||
444 | generate (&sk, nbits, use_e); | 444 | generate (&sk, nbits, use_e); |
445 | skey[0] = sk.n; | 445 | skey[0] = sk.n; |
446 | skey[1] = sk.e; | 446 | skey[1] = sk.e; |
447 | skey[2] = sk.d; | 447 | skey[2] = sk.d; |
448 | skey[3] = sk.p; | 448 | skey[3] = sk.p; |
449 | skey[4] = sk.q; | 449 | skey[4] = sk.q; |
450 | skey[5] = sk.u; | 450 | skey[5] = sk.u; |
451 | 451 | ||
452 | /* make an empty list of factors */ | 452 | /* make an empty list of factors */ |
453 | *retfactors = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof **retfactors ); | 453 | *retfactors = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof **retfactors ); |
454 | 454 | ||
455 | return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR; | 455 | return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR; |
456 | } | 456 | } |
457 | 457 | ||
458 | 458 | ||
459 | gcry_err_code_t | 459 | gcry_err_code_t |
460 | _gcry_rsa_check_secret_key( int algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey ) | 460 | _gcry_rsa_check_secret_key( int algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey ) |
461 | { | 461 | { |
462 | gcry_err_code_t err = GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR; | 462 | gcry_err_code_t err = GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR; |
463 | RSA_secret_key sk; | 463 | RSA_secret_key sk; |
464 | 464 | ||
465 | sk.n = skey[0]; | 465 | sk.n = skey[0]; |
466 | sk.e = skey[1]; | 466 | sk.e = skey[1]; |
467 | sk.d = skey[2]; | 467 | sk.d = skey[2]; |
468 | sk.p = skey[3]; | 468 | sk.p = skey[3]; |
469 | sk.q = skey[4]; | 469 | sk.q = skey[4]; |
470 | sk.u = skey[5]; | 470 | sk.u = skey[5]; |
471 | 471 | ||
472 | if (! check_secret_key (&sk)) | 472 | if (! check_secret_key (&sk)) |
473 | err = GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO; | 473 | err = GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO; |
474 | 474 | ||
475 | return err; | 475 | return err; |
476 | } | 476 | } |
477 | 477 | ||
478 | 478 | ||
479 | gcry_err_code_t | 479 | gcry_err_code_t |
480 | _gcry_rsa_encrypt (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data, | 480 | _gcry_rsa_encrypt (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data, |
481 | gcry_mpi_t *pkey, int flags) | 481 | gcry_mpi_t *pkey, int flags) |
482 | { | 482 | { |
483 | RSA_public_key pk; | 483 | RSA_public_key pk; |
484 | 484 | ||
485 | pk.n = pkey[0]; | 485 | pk.n = pkey[0]; |
486 | pk.e = pkey[1]; | 486 | pk.e = pkey[1]; |
487 | resarr[0] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (pk.n)); | 487 | resarr[0] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (pk.n)); |
488 | public (resarr[0], data, &pk); | 488 | public (resarr[0], data, &pk); |
489 | 489 | ||
490 | return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR; | 490 | return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR; |
491 | } | 491 | } |
492 | 492 | ||
493 | gcry_err_code_t | 493 | gcry_err_code_t |
494 | _gcry_rsa_decrypt (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *result, gcry_mpi_t *data, | 494 | _gcry_rsa_decrypt (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *result, gcry_mpi_t *data, |
495 | gcry_mpi_t *skey, int flags) | 495 | gcry_mpi_t *skey, int flags) |
496 | { | 496 | { |
497 | RSA_secret_key sk; | 497 | RSA_secret_key sk; |
498 | gcry_mpi_t r = MPI_NULL; /* Random number needed for blinding. */ | 498 | gcry_mpi_t r = MPI_NULL; /* Random number needed for blinding. */ |
499 | gcry_mpi_t ri = MPI_NULL; /* Modular multiplicative inverse of | 499 | gcry_mpi_t ri = MPI_NULL; /* Modular multiplicative inverse of |
500 | r. */ | 500 | r. */ |
501 | gcry_mpi_t x = MPI_NULL; /* Data to decrypt. */ | 501 | gcry_mpi_t x = MPI_NULL; /* Data to decrypt. */ |
502 | gcry_mpi_t y; /* Result. */ | 502 | gcry_mpi_t y; /* Result. */ |
503 | 503 | ||
504 | /* Extract private key. */ | 504 | /* Extract private key. */ |
505 | sk.n = skey[0]; | 505 | sk.n = skey[0]; |
506 | sk.e = skey[1]; | 506 | sk.e = skey[1]; |
507 | sk.d = skey[2]; | 507 | sk.d = skey[2]; |
508 | sk.p = skey[3]; | 508 | sk.p = skey[3]; |
509 | sk.q = skey[4]; | 509 | sk.q = skey[4]; |
510 | sk.u = skey[5]; | 510 | sk.u = skey[5]; |
511 | 511 | ||
512 | y = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk.n)); | 512 | y = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk.n)); |
513 | 513 | ||
514 | if (! (flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) | 514 | if (! (flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) |
515 | { | 515 | { |
516 | /* Initialize blinding. */ | 516 | /* Initialize blinding. */ |
517 | 517 | ||
518 | /* First, we need a random number r between 0 and n - 1, which | 518 | /* First, we need a random number r between 0 and n - 1, which |
519 | is relatively prime to n (i.e. it is neither p nor q). */ | 519 | is relatively prime to n (i.e. it is neither p nor q). */ |
520 | r = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk.n)); | 520 | r = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk.n)); |
521 | ri = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk.n)); | 521 | ri = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk.n)); |
522 | 522 | ||
523 | gcry_mpi_randomize (r, gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk.n), | 523 | gcry_mpi_randomize (r, gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk.n), |
524 | GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); | 524 | GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); |
525 | gcry_mpi_mod (r, r, sk.n); | 525 | gcry_mpi_mod (r, r, sk.n); |
526 | 526 | ||
527 | /* Actually it should be okay to skip the check for equality | 527 | /* Actually it should be okay to skip the check for equality |
528 | with either p or q here. */ | 528 | with either p or q here. */ |
529 | 529 | ||
530 | /* Calculate inverse of r. */ | 530 | /* Calculate inverse of r. */ |
531 | if (! gcry_mpi_invm (ri, r, sk.n)) | 531 | if (! gcry_mpi_invm (ri, r, sk.n)) |
532 | BUG (); | 532 | BUG (); |
533 | } | 533 | } |
534 | 534 | ||
535 | if (! (flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) | 535 | if (! (flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) |
536 | x = rsa_blind (data[0], r, sk.e, sk.n); | 536 | x = rsa_blind (data[0], r, sk.e, sk.n); |
537 | else | 537 | else |
538 | x = data[0]; | 538 | x = data[0]; |
539 | 539 | ||
540 | /* Do the encryption. */ | 540 | /* Do the encryption. */ |
541 | secret (y, x, &sk); | 541 | secret (y, x, &sk); |
542 | 542 | ||
543 | if (! (flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) | 543 | if (! (flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) |
544 | { | 544 | { |
545 | /* Undo blinding. */ | 545 | /* Undo blinding. */ |
546 | gcry_mpi_t a = gcry_mpi_copy (y); | 546 | gcry_mpi_t a = gcry_mpi_copy (y); |
547 | 547 | ||
548 | gcry_mpi_release (y); | 548 | gcry_mpi_release (y); |
549 | y = rsa_unblind (a, ri, sk.n); | 549 | y = rsa_unblind (a, ri, sk.n); |
550 | 550 | ||
551 | gcry_mpi_release (a); | 551 | gcry_mpi_release (a); |
552 | } | 552 | } |
553 | 553 | ||
554 | if (! (flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) | 554 | if (! (flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) |
555 | { | 555 | { |
556 | /* Deallocate resources needed for blinding. */ | 556 | /* Deallocate resources needed for blinding. */ |
557 | gcry_mpi_release (x); | 557 | gcry_mpi_release (x); |
558 | gcry_mpi_release (r); | 558 | gcry_mpi_release (r); |
559 | gcry_mpi_release (ri); | 559 | gcry_mpi_release (ri); |
560 | } | 560 | } |
561 | 561 | ||
562 | /* Copy out result. */ | 562 | /* Copy out result. */ |
563 | *result = y; | 563 | *result = y; |
564 | 564 | ||
565 | return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR; | 565 | return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR; |
566 | } | 566 | } |
567 | 567 | ||
568 | gcry_err_code_t | 568 | gcry_err_code_t |
569 | _gcry_rsa_sign (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data, gcry_mpi_t *skey) | 569 | _gcry_rsa_sign (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data, gcry_mpi_t *skey) |
570 | { | 570 | { |
571 | RSA_secret_key sk; | 571 | RSA_secret_key sk; |
572 | 572 | ||
573 | sk.n = skey[0]; | 573 | sk.n = skey[0]; |
574 | sk.e = skey[1]; | 574 | sk.e = skey[1]; |
575 | sk.d = skey[2]; | 575 | sk.d = skey[2]; |
576 | sk.p = skey[3]; | 576 | sk.p = skey[3]; |
577 | sk.q = skey[4]; | 577 | sk.q = skey[4]; |
578 | sk.u = skey[5]; | 578 | sk.u = skey[5]; |
579 | resarr[0] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.n)); | 579 | resarr[0] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.n)); |
580 | secret (resarr[0], data, &sk); | 580 | secret (resarr[0], data, &sk); |
581 | 581 | ||
582 | return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR; | 582 | return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR; |
583 | } | 583 | } |
584 | 584 | ||
585 | gcry_err_code_t | 585 | gcry_err_code_t |
586 | _gcry_rsa_verify (int algo, gcry_mpi_t hash, gcry_mpi_t *data, gcry_mpi_t *pkey, | 586 | _gcry_rsa_verify (int algo, gcry_mpi_t hash, gcry_mpi_t *data, gcry_mpi_t *pkey, |
587 | int (*cmp) (void *opaque, gcry_mpi_t tmp), | 587 | int (*cmp) (void *opaque, gcry_mpi_t tmp), |
588 | void *opaquev) | 588 | void *opaquev) |
589 | { | 589 | { |
590 | RSA_public_key pk; | 590 | RSA_public_key pk; |
591 | gcry_mpi_t result; | 591 | gcry_mpi_t result; |
592 | gcry_err_code_t rc; | 592 | gcry_err_code_t rc; |
593 | 593 | ||
594 | pk.n = pkey[0]; | 594 | pk.n = pkey[0]; |
595 | pk.e = pkey[1]; | 595 | pk.e = pkey[1]; |
596 | result = gcry_mpi_new ( 160 ); | 596 | result = gcry_mpi_new ( 160 ); |
597 | public( result, data[0], &pk ); | 597 | public( result, data[0], &pk ); |
598 | /*rc = (*cmp)( opaquev, result );*/ | 598 | /*rc = (*cmp)( opaquev, result );*/ |
599 | rc = mpi_cmp (result, hash) ? GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE : GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR; | 599 | rc = mpi_cmp (result, hash) ? GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE : GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR; |
600 | gcry_mpi_release (result); | 600 | gcry_mpi_release (result); |
601 | 601 | ||
602 | return rc; | 602 | return rc; |
603 | } | 603 | } |
604 | 604 | ||
605 | 605 | ||
606 | unsigned int | 606 | unsigned int |
607 | _gcry_rsa_get_nbits (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *pkey) | 607 | _gcry_rsa_get_nbits (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *pkey) |
608 | { | 608 | { |
609 | return mpi_get_nbits (pkey[0]); | 609 | return mpi_get_nbits (pkey[0]); |
610 | } | 610 | } |
611 | 611 | ||
612 | static char *rsa_names[] = | 612 | static char *rsa_names[] = |
613 | { | 613 | { |
614 | "rsa", | 614 | "rsa", |
615 | "openpgp-rsa", | 615 | "openpgp-rsa", |
616 | "oid.1.2.840.113549.1.1.1", | 616 | "oid.1.2.840.113549.1.1.1", |
617 | NULL, | 617 | NULL, |
618 | }; | 618 | }; |
619 | 619 | ||
620 | gcry_pk_spec_t _gcry_pubkey_spec_rsa = | 620 | gcry_pk_spec_t _gcry_pubkey_spec_rsa = |
621 | { | 621 | { |
622 | "RSA", rsa_names, | 622 | "RSA", rsa_names, |
623 | "ne", "nedpqu", "a", "s", "n", | 623 | "ne", "nedpqu", "a", "s", "n", |
624 | GCRY_PK_USAGE_SIGN | GCRY_PK_USAGE_ENCR, | 624 | GCRY_PK_USAGE_SIGN | GCRY_PK_USAGE_ENCR, |
625 | _gcry_rsa_generate, | 625 | _gcry_rsa_generate, |
626 | _gcry_rsa_check_secret_key, | 626 | _gcry_rsa_check_secret_key, |
627 | _gcry_rsa_encrypt, | 627 | _gcry_rsa_encrypt, |
628 | _gcry_rsa_decrypt, | 628 | _gcry_rsa_decrypt, |
629 | _gcry_rsa_sign, | 629 | _gcry_rsa_sign, |
630 | _gcry_rsa_verify, | 630 | _gcry_rsa_verify, |
631 | _gcry_rsa_get_nbits, | 631 | _gcry_rsa_get_nbits, |
632 | }; | 632 | }; |